Announcement: COVID-19

Due to the COVID-19 situation, we have regrettably suspended our conference and institutional grants programme until further notice. If you need to contact us, IME staff are working from home and calls to the office (01925-299733) are being diverted. If your call goes to answerphone, please leave a message or alternatively you can email us: and we will get back to you asap.

Booking is open! IME 2020 Conference: 'Maintaining trust in medicine in a "post truth" world'

2nd & 3rd July 2020

Austin Court, Birmingham, UK

We live in a “post-truth” world, with “facts” treated as “opinion”. “Alternative facts” and a rejection of expert knowledge touch all areas of life, including medicine and medical ethics. Discussion of vaccination, climate change, gender identity, freedom of speech and the best interests of very sick children are just some examples where evidence is contested.

Join us for one or both days to explore how clinicians, educators and medical ethicists/bioethicists can respond to these challenges.

Click here for full details and booking:


EACME newsletter, April 2020: Call for papers

To all European researchers working in medical ethics: Would you considered publishing a paper, short article or report in the EACME newsletter?

EACME comprises more than 60 centres around Europe, with further affiliate members beyond the subcontinent. Centres receive our newsletter three times a year. The newsletter includes short, informal, articles (300-1500 words) comprising event reports, announcements, reviews, thesis abstracts, grant news, recent research, as well more scholarly discussions of ethical and legal topics. It is a great way for junior academics to raise their profile in the academy, and for more established researchers to share their activities more widely. 


The deadline next EACME newsletter is on April 1st, and newsletter readers will be very interested to hear about what you have been up to. If you would like to contribute to this, or future EACME newsletters, please contact the editor, Dr Giles Birchley:



Review: IME Student Conference 2020

The IME Student Conference 'Ethical Considerations in the Pursuit of Perfection' took place on Saturday 8th February 2020 at Leeds Medical School.

Organised by the IME Student Council, the conference also included the National Student Debate Final (Leeds v Sheffield) and judging of The Mark Brennan Poster Prize. (See the Mark Brennan Prize winners here.) 

Read all about the conference here.

Georgia Scott, a final year medical student at University of Birmingham attended the PET conference 'Reality Check: A realistic look at assisted conception' December '19 after successfully applying for one of the IME-funded student places offered by PET.

Georgia has written an article summarising the conference which has been featured on the British Medical Journal's Sexual & Reproductive Health blog.

Click HERE to read Geogia's article.

Jordan Parsons, MScR student at University of Bristol received an IME Conference Grant to present orally at the Australasian Association of Bioethics & Health Law & the New Zealand Bioethics Conference, NZ, Nov 2019. Read his report below:

 Thanks to the generosity of the Institute of Medical Ethics, I was able to attend the 2019 Australasian Association of Bioethics & Health Law and New Zealand Bioethics Conference in Dunedin, New Zealand. The opportunity to present my work to an audience I would not usually find myself in front of was extremely valuable as allowed me to engage in discussion about my work from the perspective of its applicability to different jurisdictions. Whist my work primarily concerns the UK, it is interesting to consider the differences internationally and what might be learned from other countries both in terms of successes and failures. Discussions following my presentation provided this interesting perspective and I have already started to incorporate it into my work.

In addition to benefitting my own work, attending this conference gave me an insight into the research priorities in both Australia and New Zealand. I was especially keen to hear about research concerning indigenous populations as this is something that is not part of UK bioethics. One topic that received a lot of attention was voluntary assisted dying as it is very topical in Australia at the moment with the recent introduction of legislation permitting it in Victoria. As the UK euthanasia debate is relatively quite currently, it was interesting to discover how things are progressing elsewhere and in particular to hear about the sorts of patients seeking voluntary assisted dying.

Owing to the location of this conference, it was a chance for me to network with academics I would not likely have met otherwise and to catch up with those I already know in Australia. It is hugely important to develop and maintain international networks in academia and thanks to the IME I have been able to do so. I met people at the conference with similar research interests and with whom I may end up collaborating on research.

Thank you again to the Institute of Medical Ethics for such generous support. I am hugely grateful.

Elizabeth Chloe Romanis, PhD candidate in Bioethics & Medical Law, University of Manchester received an IME Conference Grant to present orally at the American Society of Bioethics & Humanities Conference, Pittsburgh, Oct 2019. Read her report below:

Thanks to support from the IME travel funds for postgraduate research students I was able to attend the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities Annual Conference this year in Pittsburgh 24th-27th October 2019. The conference was enormous with a multitude of panels and presentations to choose from as well as big name keynotes and networking meetings and receptions. It was almost overwhelming, but incredibly exciting to have so much choice. Being interested primarily in reproduction, law and ethics – I was really spoilt.

Whilst there were so many different panels on a wide range of ethical issues to attend (everything from reproethics, to anthropology in medicine, to medical education) the theme for the conference was Bioethics and Resilience, and in all of the events I participated in the adherence to the theme was notable. There was a real attempt to focus on the structural and institutional inequalities in healthcare and how bioethics and the humanities can serve social justice and contribute meaningfully to discussions about change. I learnt a lot about how the responsibility of the humanities, and of academic scholarship, in the identification of and responding to social injustice. It is so important that in our work bioethicists do not pretend that our ideas exist in a vacuum or that bioethics is entirely separate from the political spaces in which we think.

No paper at the conference made this clearer than a paper by Ariella Messing and Rachel Fabi about 'Reproductive Injustice at the Border.' This paper emphasised the importance of embedding our thinking about reproductive rights in context to expose injustice. They made a compelling argument about how there was clear evidence of reproductive oppression at the US-Mexico border and that this was part of the considered and deliberate attempt by the current US administration to deter immigration. In immigration detention centres there is routine denial of abortion care to incarcerated pregnant people. Equally, there is clear disregard of the right to have children in the denial of prenatal care to pregnant people and of the right to parent in the routine separation of families in centres. Messing and Fabi posit that such injustice demands action from bioethics. There can be no such thing as an innocent bystander in the face of such abuse.

A keynote by Margaret Battin ('Death and Sex: Using Thought Experiments with Modern Technology' was another of the main highlights of the conference for me. In this talk she considered how the thought experiment has normative force in considering the real-life implications of different conditions in real life issues, with social justice, equality and dignity at their centre. She argues that most objections to thought experiments normally come from thinking about how we get from here to there because in our current world – race, gender and class oppression are pervasive and so it is hard to imagine the subject of the thought experiment without inequality. She argues that this is the wrong way to think – thought experiments should do their normative work by seeing if we can imagine a world in which equality is realised and then work backwards to see how we can get there. She made her argument by suggesting that the world would be a better place if everyone, that is all fertile persons (whether female or male), routinely used long-acting, effective, reversible and 'forgettable' contraception all the time. She posited that in this world 'everyone would have to make a positive choice to have a baby.' I wasn't sure I was convinced, but it gave me a lot to think about.

At the conference I also presented my most recent paper 'Artificial Womb Technology and Clinical Translation' (which at the time was not yet published) on a panel about ethics in paediatric research. It was a great opportunity to get feedback from bioethicists in the US about my work because I am soon to be submitting my PhD and this paper features in my thesis.

I am really grateful to the IME for facilitating my attendance at this event.

Elizabeth Chloe Romanis, PhD candidate in Bioethics & Medical Law, University of Manchester

Dunja Begović, PhD candidate in Bioethics & Medical Jurisprudence, University of Manchester received an IME Conference Grant to present orally at the 33rd European Conference on Philosophy of Medicine & Health Care, Oslo, Aug 2019. Read her report below:

This summer I received an IME conference grant to cover the registration fees for the 2019 annual conference of the European Society for Philosophy of Medicine and Healthcare (ESPMH) 'Philosophy and Ethics at the Edge of Medicine', taking place at the University of Oslo, 7-10 August 2019. This is one of the largest European bioethics events, attracting scholars from all parts of the continent as well as the rest of the world, so as a PhD student I was honoured to have the opportunity to present at it. As the conference fee is quite high, the support of the IME was essential for my attendance.

Taking place over three days with 6-8 parallel sessions running each morning and afternoon, covering a wide range of themes from all areas of bioethics, the conference offered so many possibilities that the greatest challenge for me was to decide which talks to attend. In line with my research interests, which are primarily in reproductive ethics and particularly related to women's autonomy in pregnancy, I made sure to be there for parallel sessions like 'The limits of autonomy', 'Mothers and embryos' (in which I also presented my paper Maternal-fetal surgery: A challenge to existing notions?') and 'Genomics and reproductive medicine', where I heard some fascinating talks on issues such as obtaining informed consent electronically (Kristi Lõuk, University of Tartu), regulating surrogacy (Katarzyna Korbacz, University of Warsaw), the reification of the human embryo (Anna Smajdor, University of Oslo), and posthumous paternity (Edna Katzenelson, Tel Aviv University), among others. I also dropped into various other sessions to attend presentations on diverse subjects like epistemic injustice in clinical ethics consultation (Søren Holm, University of Manchester), self-harm and relational autonomy (Petra Gelhaus, University of Münster), body modifications for gender expression (Timothy Murphy, Hastings Center), the meaning of genetic connections and the notion of family (Daniela Cutas, Umeå University); as well as ethical commentary on cases like the He Jiankui scandal, focusing on its implications for social justice and solidarity in genetics (Darryl Gunson, University of the West of Scotland), and the Tuskegee syphilis study, shedding a light on the untold stories of the participants' wives (RayLee Otero-Bell). In general, I found all the talks I attended illuminating and relevant in different ways, and can only wonder what other interesting research I might have missed due to overlap between sessions.

Another great aspect of the ESPMH conference were the special seminars on particular topics, where invited speakers gave short presentations followed by a discussion and questions from the audience. Unfortunately, these also overlapped with the parallel sessions making the choice of what to attend even more difficult! However, I am definitely glad that I started off the conference at the special session on 'New-old ethical perspectives on the development of prenatal testing practices', as this is a topic I find highly engaging having written one of the papers in my PhD about it. It was really exciting to hear from scholars doing both empirical and theoretical work on this subject, in the context of different cultural, legal and ethical settings. Tamar Nov Klaiman of Ben Gurion University presented her research on the attitudes of parents towards non-invasive prenatal testing for Down's Syndrome in Israel, highlighting how societal views relate to parental decisions, while Stefan Reisch of the University of Lübeck gave an interesting empirically founded comparison of how women in Germany and Israel respectively perceive the issue of health insurance coverage for this kind of testing. Vardit Ravitsky of the University of Montreal discussed the future of prenatal testing in the light of the increasing transparency of the fetus, while Aviad Raz and Yael Hashiloni-Dolev presented their research on the parental and professional experiences of participating in prenatal testing. The ensuing discussion looked in more depth at the ethical implications of social context and the development of testing practices, which I found fascinating and very relevant for my own research.

I am very thankful to the IME for their generous support which allowed me to attend this conference and present my paper, as well as expand my bioethical horizons on a variety of fascinating subjects. 

Dunja Begović, PhD candidate in Bioethics and Medical Jurisprudence, Centre for Social Ethics and Policy, School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester


IME Student Conference 2020: 'Ethical Considerations in the Pursuit of Perfection'

Saturday 8th February 2020, University of Leeds Medical School

Keynote Speaker: Georgia Testa, Lead for Medical Ethics & Law, University of Leeds 

This conference, organised by the IME Student Council, is free-to-attend (£20 deposit required, refundable upon attendance). Students & foundation year doctors are very welcome.

Click HERE for more information and to register.

A limited number of IME Conference Grants are available for attendance at the Student Conference. Preference will be given to those presenting a paper or poster. Click here for more information about our conference grants.

Alexa Warnes, a medical student at Brighton & Sussex Medical School received an IME Bursary for her elective in May 2019. Read the report of her project below

End of Life Choices – Reflections from a medical elective placement in Oregon, USA

As a trainee doctor, death and dying is something that I will inevitably be dealing with during my professional life. And caring for people who are dying can be one of the most dramatic things that doctors will come across. Yet, it still isn't something we are practiced in talking about. I wanted more experience in how to look after the dying person, and decided to organise my medical elective in end-of-life care. I chose Oregon, USA, as a destination because they have an interesting model of palliative care alongside Medical Aid in Dying (MAID). MAID came out of the Death with Dignity law – a law passed in Oregon over twenty years ago, which allows people at the end of life with a six-month prognosis (or less) to take a medication to assist in their death.

Prior to my arrival in Oregon, I was expecting that MAID - a legal choice at the end of life - would be brought up in consultation as readily as, for example, a new drug regimen for pain management, or an appropriate antiemetic to help with nausea. This is not to say that the discussion would be a simple one, but more that it would be easily accessible to the dying person as a part of a wider conversation about end-of-life choices. I soon realised I was naïve in this expectation, as the reality is actually that MAID was never something that would be 'offered' to the patient in consultation with a healthcare professional. It became clear, from what I saw and heard, that the few people who were eligible and then opted for MAID were all people who had very decidedly made this decision for themselves, independently of their doctor. MAID was never something I saw initiated by the doctor. And when I asked doctors about how the conversation with a patient came up, it was apparent – even by those advocating for MAID as a choice – that it would be inappropriate to initiate discussions for fear of it being interpreted as coercion.

Alongside thinking about the fear of being coercive, I also became interested in how a doctor's individual belief system may affect how a patient accesses MAID, as the moral application of MAID continues to cause divisions. I have always been very curious about the power of an individual's personal beliefs, and how these beliefs reveal themselves during professional life. Personal beliefs shape what we think to be right and wrong, and it does not strike me as surprising that when it comes to life and death, people feel very strongly about how these events should play out. In a similar vein to anti-abortion arguments, there are groups of people who believe in the preservation of life, and thus do not believe in MAID. Whilst this is not a piece of writing arguing the bioethics of whether MAID is morally right or wrong, it does invite a consideration of when personal beliefs may overtake, for example, a doctors professional integrity and duty to their patient.

I began thinking about this early in my trip after I met Dr Grey*, a family doctor with many years of experience working as an advocate for MAID. As a doctor, his thoughts were that there is a paramount duty to use professional integrity to guide clinical practice towards what best serves the beliefs and wishes of the patient. This is very different, he says, to using one's own personal belief system to guide what one might think as best for their patient. And Dr Grey explains that where some doctors may resist conversations about MAID because of personal beliefs, he sees it as his professional duty to talk to a patient openly and honestly about all the options of how to die. Thus, in order to do this, it may be appropriate for a doctor to be the first initiator of a conversation about MAID.

Dr Grey's approach stuck with me during my time in Oregon, and I slowly realised that he was in fact rather maverick in his outlook. As the first days of my clinical placement in the hospice went by, conversations between healthcare workers and their patients began gathering in my brain. I found myself often waiting for MAID to be offered to the dying patient, yet this offer was never made. Realising this, I stopped waiting, and instead focused on how different words were delivered about common themes of prognosis, the "dying" process, and then death itself. And I began to see that to be an advocate for MAID, this did not necessarily have to equate with the healthcare worker initiating the conversation with the patient. But it could do – and as Dr Grey explained, for him it was actually part of his professional duty. For most, however, supporting the option of MAID as an end-of-life choice meant responding to a patient's request and guiding them towards necessary next steps.

My reflections on MAID in Oregon have focused on this aspect of "how to have the conversation" because it seems to be one of the main areas that both doctors and patients have difficulty – and thus something that may come up here in the UK should we ever pass a similar law. There are of course many practical issues that go alongside bringing in new healthcare legislation such as ensuring appropriate safeguarding measures, organisation of policy frameworks, and medication issues. But as an ethical question, I did notice myself continually returning to how these initial conversations about MAID actually came about. I am not yet decided on what I consider to be the "best" approach – whether it is the duty of the doctor to initiate the discussion – or instead whether it should always come first from the patient. I see the logic of the latter, but I am compelled by Dr Grey's "professional integrity" and the duty he places on himself to discuss all end-of-life options (including MAID) with his patients. Perhaps there is no 'best' way at all, and as is often the case, it will depend on each individual patient. But it is an interesting thought, and one that will require a doctors scrutiny here in the UK, should they ever find themselves in these consultations in the future.


Craig Tilley, a medical student at Brighton & Sussex Medical School, received an IME Scholarship for his BSc Bioethics intercalated degree at University of Bristol, Sept 2017. The report of his project is below

Understanding Dignity: A Fundamental Concept in the Assisted Dying Debate


Dignity is a concept that is intrinsically linked to the assisted dying debate, yet it is considered a murky notion that lacks the clarity to bring anything meaningful to bioethical discourse. This project had three parts. First, to provide an overview of end of life law in the UK. Second, to explore the variety philosophical concepts of dignity and settle on a definition. Third, to apply my defined concept of dignity to the end of life debate.

Part 1

I started my examination of the legal landscape in the United Kingdom (UK) at the end of life with a comparison between the cases of R v Cox[1]  and Airedale NHS Trust v Bland.[2] This provided the perfect springboard for the debate, as it highlights the critical difference between act and omission that UK law has long relied upon. The withdrawal of life sustaining treatments is seen as an omission at law. Therefore, it is not an act that hastens death and is not akin to euthanasia. These cases, in combination with the Suicide Act 1961 provide the basis for the UK's legal principles at the end of life. These are as follows: Assisted dying, be that active euthanasia or assisted suicide is illegal. Whereas passive euthanasia, such as the withdrawal of life sustaining treatments is legal.

With this foundation laid, I move on to discuss the cases that have challenged the UK's current stance. Starting with the cases of Pretty[3] and Purdy[4]. The former leading to the European Court of Human Rights recognising that the UK's current law breached Ms Pretty's right to self-determination under Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998. However, this right was sacrificed in order to protect the wider population. Ms Purdy's case lead to the publishing of a policy that brought clarity to prosecution of offenses under the law surrounding assisted suicide.

Finally, I explored the arguments in the case of Nicklinson.[5] Despite this case being unsuccessful, in their judgments the majority supreme court justices appeared to sympathise with the claim that existing law was incompatible with Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Further to which, it is argued that their statements suggest that Parliament must satisfactorily address this issue. Commentators, such as Hobson argued that in this context, these statements were tantamount to a change to law.[6] The Assisted Dying Bills that followed did not pass. Later, when Noel Conway challenged, many predicted that the declaration of incompatibly would arrive. Ultimately, this did not come to fruition.

Part 2

Macklin argues that without any meaningful definition it is a useless concept that can be removed from bioethical discourse without loss of content.[7] In order to salvage dignity I look to historical uses of the term, before looking to more recent discussion.

This began with an exploration of Immanuel Kant's use of dignity. Kant saw dignity as the intrinsic value that all human beings possess due to their capacity for autonomous action.[8] However, he failed to appreciate that not all human beings have a capacity for autonomous action, such as those in a coma, yet we still see them as having dignity that can be affronted. Therefore, I abandoned the Kantian approach for a modernistic account by Neal.[9]

Neal sees universal vulnerability as the organising idea of dignity. The value of dignity is its positive valuation of the things that make all humans vulnerable to harms. I failed to find flaw's in Neal's claims, but felt her account lacked the clarity to be a useful concept. I decided to combine her account, with its basis of vulnerability with Foster's Aristotelian account of dignity. Foster's account sees dignity as a way of "being", which I argue can be seen as "being vulnerable" as all humans are. This model for application of dignity uses a consequentialist transaction in which all stakeholders in a decision have their dignity accounted for.  Ultimately, the transaction aims to protect dignity by promoting the views of the most vulnerable and maximising the thriving of stakeholders as a whole.

Part 3

Next, I needed to perform an audit of the dignity interests of all stakeholders. I considered three stakeholders; the patient, 'at risk' groups and doctors.

In the case of the patient, whom I considered to be the most vulnerable group, I concluded that only in a very specific set of circumstances would an assisted death promote dignity. These are that the patient is in a state of such permanent ill-health that they lack the capacity to thrive and are only moving away from thriving and towards greater vulnerability. Only in these circumstances will assisted dying protect the dignity of patients.

Next, we consider 'at risk' groups such as the old, disabled and psychologically distressed. It can be argued that individuals belonging to these groups will be considered as lacking in the capacity to thrive at all times. I found this issue difficult to overcome and brought to light the need to individualise thriving which makes my model of dignity less useful as a general concept.

When considering the dignity of the doctor, I considered a thriving doctor to be one who practices within on the goals of medicine and professional integrity. Many argue that preservation of life is the most critical goal of medicine. However, in response I argue that once a patient is recognised as dying, this is no longer the critical goal and is replaced by a focus on comfort. Therefore, a doctor who aids a patient with a terminal illness and a voluntary request for an assisted death does not contradict the doctors thriving.


From my three sections I arrive at three conclusions. One, a hidden majority of supreme court justices see current law as incompatible with human rights. Two, the murky notion of dignity can find footing in intrinsic human vulnerability. Three, auditing the dignity of all stakeholders I arrive with a result in support of assisted dying for terminally ill individuals who lack the capacity to thrive.

[1] [1992] 12 BMLR 38.

[1] [1993] AC 789 (HL).

[1] R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2001] EWHC Admin 788.

[1] R (Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2008] EWHC 2565 (Admin), [2009] HRLR 7.

[1] R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice; R (AM) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] AC 657.

[1] Clark Hobson, 'Is it now institutionally appropriate for the courts to consider whether he assisted dying ban is human rights compatible? Conway v Secretary of state for Justice.' (2017) Medical Law Review accessed 8 April 2018.

[1] Ruth Macklin, 'Dignity is a useless concept.' (2003) 327 British Medical Journal 1419.

[1] Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals (JW Ellington trans, 2nd ed, Hackett, 1994) 40.

[1] Mary Neal '"Not gods but animals": Human dignity and vulnerable subjecthood' (2012) 33 Liverpool Law Rev 177.

Sara Khalid, a medical student at University of Exeter received an IME Scholarship for her intercalated BA in Medical Humanities with Ethics, Sept 2018. Read the report of her project below

'To treat or not to treat'- the modern's physician's dilemma in the discussion of paediatric end of life care


Paediatric end of life care is becoming an increasingly prevalent conundrum for doctors. With an increase in premature neonatal survival, a new population is arising1. End of life care now includes babies who have beaten their statistical survival probability odds, bringing new ethical considerations. Highly publicised cases of Charlie Gard and Alfie Evans have caused public uproar, presidential involvement and professionals receiving death threats3-5. The courts often become involved, a traumatic experience for both doctors and parents. Could perhaps the answer in the best way to manage such cases lie in returning to ethical theory and principles? Furthermore, could revisiting ethical theory shed some light on the reason as to why the courts are often seen backing the doctors' decisions rather than the parents desires?

Due to word constraints, this summary only describes main discussions. Others investigations have not been covered but are mentioned in the conclusion.


Information was obtained through literary searches and databases. Modules taken in Medical Ethics and Law and Disability in Society, provided skills and knowledge in interpreting, understanding and criticising end of life law and ethics.

Key ethical principles

It has been suggested that a thorough understanding of ethics will aid decision-making6. However, as ethical principles are explored, more clashes between them are found. Identifying clashes illustrates inconsistencies in end of life reasoning that is currently used as justification in paediatric end of life decision-making.


Autonomy is the foundation on which patient desired passive euthanasia (PPE) is built on, as seen in Re B7. However, autonomy is not respected in active euthanasia (AE) or assisted suicide (AS) as seen in the case of Tony Nicklinson8. Therefore, the discussion surrounding autonomy is complex and inconsistent enough without the consideration of paediatric patients who are unable to voice their autonomy, with Gillick's competence also being of no use in the neonate population.

To overcome this, English Law requires parents and clinicians to agree on a 'best interests' decision on behalf of the child with the courts making the decision if disagreement, as was seen with Alfie Evans, occurs. However, 'best interests' is vague and difficult to gauge and gives rise to a standoff between the parents' and doctor's autonomy. Patient autonomy is not absolute, with patients not able to demand treatment. AE and AS requires a substance to be administered whereas patient requested PE declines treatment and is therefore covered by autonomy. This concept could be extrapolated to parents, perhaps offering a solution to when disagreement occurs. Parents' autonomy by proxy can decline treatment but not demand it. However, this is also not clear-cut as doctors can also override parent's decisions in refusing treatment, if they believe it not to be in the child's best interests e.g. blood transfusions in Jehovah's Witnesses.

Sanctity of life

Sanctity of life is often cited why AS and AE cannot be legalised. However, this argument is often criticised, due to its religious origins having no place in secular state9, but also as it is of no concern when treatment is withdrawn.

Dworkin argues sanctity of life coexists with quality of life. If a person has a poor quality of life, its value diminishes and therefore no longer protected by the principle9. However, Dworkin's reasoning is problematic as it justifies terminating individuals' life with social/mental issues who believe their life has no value when other methods to remedy that belief are available. Furthermore, in paediatric cases it is arguably impossible to make a judgment about the kind of life a baby will have. Clinicians can attempt to predict but they cannot say for definite, seen in the ongoing debate surrounding Down syndrome and terminations10,11. Furthermore, value comes from more than just health. Those considered 'healthy' for numerous social reasons lead lives with seemingly no value. However, suggesting a neonate's life not be protected for either having a disability or being born into difficult social situations e.g. as an addict due to maternal drug use would be absurd, rendering sanctity of life also useless in this discussion.

Intention verses foresight

A loophole to explain why AE and AS are illegal, yet doctor dictated PE is not, is that the latter foresees death but does not intend it. This can therefore be used to understand previous paediatric end of life decisions. Keown argues that a distinction exists between intended consequences of an act and foreseen consequences of act, as certain12. A surgeon knows that surgery will cause post-operative pain. This differs from the surgeon, who operates in order to induce pain. Furthermore, the pain is not the means by which the operation will succeed, therefore foreseeing death is different to intending and knowing a side effect of an action does not prove causation. However, the law can only work when consequences of an action are assessed over the act itself13. Therefore, in the case of Indirect Euthanasia, the purpose of an act could reasonably be pain relief, however PE has no similar purpose that doctors could cite apart from death.

As foreshadowing arguments are unconvincing, there appears no reason why AS and AE are illegal. This complicates Paediatric end of life decision making, as what is often portrayed as beneficent terminating of suffering, is through studying ethical theory, technically no different to illegal and condemned acts of AE and AS.


End of life decisions are an ethical maze. The law is not morally consistent, with study of ethical principles showing inconsistencies. Furthermore, such discussion usually centres on adult patients, with little discussion on paediatrics. This summary only touches upon some of the issues in this argument, with topics of omission verses act, personhood, dignity and the weight placed on medical opinion by the courts all further areas that should be considered. What is clear is that although an increased understanding of ethical theory is useful for one's own understanding, it does little to help the physician faced with a difficult paediatric end of life decision, as the more one delves into the theory, the more inconstancies and questions arise.


Santhakumaran S, Statnikov Y, Gray D, et al Survival of very preterm infants admitted to neonatal care in England 2008–2014: time trends and regional variation Archives of Disease in Childhood - Fetal and Neonatal Edition Published Online First: 07 September 2017. doi: 10.1136/archdischild-2017-312748

Dyer C. Doctors and parents agree care plan for toddler with terminal condition.

Robert Mendick. [Internet] The Telegraph: Charlie Gard court case: Parents have just 48 hours to prove untested, experimental technique works. July 2017, Accessed December 2019. Available from:

Mary MacLeod. [Internet] Great Ormond Street: Statement from Chairman of Great Ormond Street Hospital, 22 July 2017. July 2017. Accessed December 2019. Available from:

Dyer C. Doctors can withdraw treatment from child on life support, says judge. BMJ: British Medical Journal (Online). 2018 Feb 21;360.

Tripp J, McGregor D. Withholding and withdrawing of life sustaining treatment in the newborn. Archives of Disease in Childhood-Fetal and Neonatal Edition. 2006 Jan 1;91(1):F67-71

Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] EWHC 429.

R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38.

Jonathan Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, (5th edn, Oxford University Press, 2014) 528

BBC Radio 4. Disability. Beyond Belief. 10/9/18. Available from: [Accessed on 25/2/19]

A world without Down's syndrome? 2016.

Jonathan Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, (5th edn, Oxford University Press, 2014) 520

Andrew McGee, "Finding a way through the ethical and legal maze: withdrawal of medical treatment and euthanasia" [2005] 357, 373.

In memory of The Very Rev'd Edward Shotter, Hon Vice-President, Institute of Medical Ethics

Ted Shotter

(29 June 1933 – 3 July 2019)

We are deeply saddened to inform you of the recent passing of Ted Shotter, Hon Vice-President, IME. Ted was a true pioneer in the field of medical ethics and leaves behind an outstanding legacy, both in the UK and worldwide. Prof Raanan Gillon, President of the IME, has written a tribute which he delivered at Ted's funeral service at Blythburgh Church ('the cathedral of the marshes') in Suffolk on 29 July, and which will give you a flavour of Ted's life and achievements...

Edward Shotter - a true innovator for medical ethics

I was introduced to Ted in the very early 1970s by the Dean for postgraduate students at University College Hospital London, Gerald Stern, who knew I had an interest in medical ethics. 'Ted Shotter is the man you need to meet' – and how right he was. However at that first meeting I told Ted- who had previously been a Student Christian Movement chaplain to medical students- that I very much doubted that I, an atheist Jew- albeit educated at Christ's Hospital- could be much help in his very Christian– as I then perceived it to be- London Medical Group. He smiled- he might even have winked. 'If you'll forgive my saying so Dr Gillon I think you're a Godsend'. Ted had in fact been assiduously extending the teaching of medical ethics to medical students of all faiths and none. Well we were friends ever since and I was appointed another of his 'Assistant Directors' of the London Medical Group. The LMG as it was known, along with the similar student-led groups that arose in every UK medical school, was the first of Ted Shotter's three major contributions to medical ethics both in the UK and internationally, for it introduced outside experts into the teaching of medical ethics to medical students, and about subjects chosen by the students themselves. Since Hippocratic times medical ethics had been a zealously guarded doctors-only zone but Ted changed all that!

His second major contribution was the invention of the Institute of Medical Ethics, at first somewhat laboriously named the Society for the Study of Medical Ethics. That Institute is these days a significant UK charity promoting teaching, research and publication in medical ethics, and providing grants for doing so, thanks in large measure to its co-ownership- with the British Medical Association- of the very successful Journal of Medical Ethics. That journal is Ted's third major contribution to the development of national and international medical ethics, for it is now one of the world's leading bioethics journals. Again Ted's encouragement was hardly a hindrance to my application back in 1980, to be, after Alastair Campbell, the JME's second editor- a post I somewhat greedily held for twenty years.

I was so pleased to have very recently been able to pass on slightly belated birthday greetings from his IME colleagues, friends and admirers and to reminisce with him about the achievements I've just mentioned; and also to recall his honorary Fellowship of the Royal College of Physicians, as well as his international recognition by the American Hastings Center in bestowing its prestigious Henry Knowles Beecher Award for life time contributions to bioethics. The occasion was lunch at Westhall, nobly prepared for the two of us by Jane before she retired to her own sick bed. Ted was in wonderful form and several times said what a fortunate man he was in so many ways, and especially in his lovely and loving wife and family.

It was a terrible shock to learn that he had died the following day- but it remains my strong impression that he died a truly happy man.

Prof Raanan Gillon
President, Institute of Medical Ethics

Dr Abidemi Otaiku, FY1, received an IME conference grant to present a poster at the Neuroethics Network meeting, Paris, June 2019. Read his report below

The Neuroethics of Dreaming? Ethical & Psychological Implications of Lucid Dream 'Immorality'

I recently had the opportunity to attend the Neuroethics Network 2019 Meeting which was held at the Brain and Spine Institute in Paris, an internationally recognised neuroscience research foundation, located on the grounds of the world famous Salpêtrière hospital. 

This was an intimate three day meeting that brought together early career researchers and established academics from around the world working in neurology, psychiatry, philosophy, ethics and neuroscience, to present and discuss the latest research findings in Neuroethics - the academic discipline concerned with the ethical, societal and legal implications raised by advances in neuroscience and neurotechnology.

Over the three days of the meeting, there were seven 'Athenaeum Seminars', which were essentially three to four themed talks grouped together in the programme, each covering a key topic in neuroethics. These ranged from highly pragmatic talks focused on ethical issues arising from treating complex psychiatric patients, in the 'Psychiatric Illness' seminar, all the way to the more esoteric and philosophical, but still fascinating talks, regarding machine consciousness and 'machine moral responsibility' in the 'Other Minds' seminar. Other seminars had a more interdisciplinary nature such as the seminar 'Forensic Psychiatry and Neurolaw' which explored how neuroscience may affect how we determine the legal culpability of offenders, and also, how neuroscience based interventions – such as so-called 'moral bioenhancement' may one day be used to prevent offenders from committing further crimes.

In addition to the talks included in the Athenaeum Seminars, there were also a number of e-poster presentations that were displayed throughout the meeting. I had the privilege of having an abstract for my research on the ethical and psychological implications of "immoral" lucid dream behaviour, accepted for an e-poster presentation at the meeting. I received some very helpful and interesting feedback from the delegates who had read my poster and had come to find me during breaks in the programme to discuss my work further. I am hoping to write up this research for submission to a medical ethics or neuroethics journal in the coming weeks, and I will most certainly be integrated some of the constructive feedback that I received throughout this meeting to improve the final manuscript.

Overall this was a very enjoyable and intellectually stimulating meeting, which introduced me to new areas of neuroethics and also increased my knowledge of areas that I had already been familiar with. Having this opportunity to present my work at an international conference at such an early stage in my career was a greatly informative experience, and has given me the confidence to submit my work to other international medical ethics or neuroethics conferences in the future.

I am very grateful to the IME for awarding me with a Postgraduate Conference Grant, which enabled me to attend and present my work at the Neuroethics Network Meeting, which I highly enjoyed, and which has also deepened my knowledge of the fascinating field of neuroethics.

Sarah Kelly, a medical student at University of Edinburgh received an IME Scholarship for her Master of Bioethics intercalated degree at Harvard University, August 2017. Read the report of her project below:

Handling Medical Error: Lessons to be learned from the US?

Medical error is a leading cause of death in Western nations.1 To address this problem, there have been recent public policy and legal reforms in the UK, including a statutory duty of candour and emphasis on institutional support and responsibility.2 These aim to engender a culture of openness and transparency in order to better prevent, address and learn from medical errors. However, there have been limited concurrent educational or institutional changes to support these statutory and professional obligations. Current practices around institutional handling of medical error continues to fall short of these professed policy and legal standards, as was borne out in the case of Dr. Hadiza Bawa-Garba.3 This case reignited debate around medical errors in the UK and how they ought to be handled and the medical community expressed outrage and fear over the decisions of the Court and General Medical Council.3 It highlighted the tension between the legal tendency to pinpoint blame and the professed aim of the medical community to acknowledge collective responsibility. In particular, many called for new ways to consider how institutions can better support individuals involved in instances of medical error.

Medical practice in the US has gained a reputation for its litigious culture and many individual hospitals are taking steps to avoid medical errors in order to reduce litigation and improve patient care.4 As part of the Masters of Bioethics programme at the Center for Bioethics, Harvard Medical School I interned with the Ethics Committee at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center. As part of this I assisted in ethics consultations requested by patients and clinicians and I took particular interest in their proactive approach to handling medical errors. This report considers some of the steps taken by BIDMC to address and reduce “preventable harm” and how they might be applicable to UK medical practice.

One method by which BIDMC aims to promote collective responsibility around medical error is by publishing quarterly reports of “Preventable Harm” online.5 On their publicly available website, the hospital lists the number of reported errors across many contexts, including surgical site infections, falls resulting in injury and disrespectful communication. This allows for ready identification of common errors, which has led to review and improvement in areas such as infection control. It aims to destigmatise error and share responsibility for improving practice between clinicians and management. By encouraging open dialogue around errors, the hospital aims to demonstrate to patients and families that they are actively identifying important contexts where mistakes commonly occur and proactively addressing them. This approach to transparency is relatively unique among Massachusetts hospitals and I could find no record of UK Health Boards doing anything similar. Given that data around numbers of incidents of medical error are commonly recorded by hospital management, it would be feasible to create comparable documentation in the UK—whether available online to the public, to clinicians only, or available upon request. Tracking such numbers might provide the institutions with a certain accountability to ensure that areas of common mistakes are acknowledged and could identify specific areas that require additional support.

Secondly, BIDMC (along with other Massachusetts hospitals) have introduced a Communication, Apology and Resolution (or “CARe”) initiative.6 Clinical staff are provided with training to encourage timely communication with patients and families.5 The “CARe” initiative is offered as means of encouraging collaboration between involved parties to prevent future errors. Meetings between parties following difficult events can provide valuable time for personal and team reflections on the surrounding circumstances and emotions and what might be done in future to improve practice. Decisions regarding whether to pursue litigation are complex and multifactorial but the provision of an alternative, non-adversarial but official pathway for dealing with mistakes is thought to reduce rates of legal action. Data tracking practice since 2001 at the University of Michigan has demonstrated that such a programme as led to a reduction in the number of patient injuries claims, system improvements following investigation of claims, shorter time to claim resolution, and significantly decreased costs for both the claimants and the hospital involved.4 Given that the cost of legal claims is known to be rising around the UK, such a system would not only encourage valuable (and confidential) individual reflection but also serve as a means of allowing funds to be spent on improving care rather than costly compensation.


Thirdly, BIDMC Ethics Committee provide consultations at any point of patients’ journeys. They can provide support, guidance and mediation around complex decisions, reducing harms like disrespectful communication. They also offer discussions and debriefs with patients, families, and clinicians after difficult events to ensure all perspectives are considered to improve practice. Ethics committees who provide such contemporaneous advice, actively meet with all stakeholders, and provide care-guiding advice remain rare in the UK;7 in the US, almost every hospital now has some form of committee providing such consultations.8 My experience demonstrated the role of committee members (with appropriate training in communication) being involved early in discussions with the medical teams after an error to advise on the most suitable methods and circumstances to discuss the errors with patient and family. They often worked in conjunction with the hospital legal team to counsel on how to broach the subject with honesty and integrity, while assuaging clinicians’ commonly-held fears around litigation.

In conclusion, medical error is a complex but important issue that must be acknowledged and addressed. My experience with BIDMC Ethics Committee has demonstrated some ways in which mistakes can be identified, tackled and prevented. Transparent record-keeping of numbers and patterns of incidents, explicit programmes to encourage communication and collaboration around medical error, and ethics committees to provide guidance and mediation are all examples of some methods that could be used to improve practice.




  1. Makary, M, and Daniel, M. 2016. "Medical Error—The Third Leading Cause of Death in the US". BMJ, p.i2139.
  2. Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014
  3. Cohen, D. 2017. "Back to Blame: The Bawa-Garba Case and the Patient Safety Agenda". BMJ, j5534.

4.Michigan Medicine. University of Michigan (2019). The Michigan Model: Medical Malpractice and Patient Safety at Michigan Medicine. [online] University of Michigan. Available at: [Accessed 16 June 2019].


  1. BIDMC. Eliminating Preventable Harm at BIDMC. [Accessed 16 June 2019]


6.Massachusetts Alliance for Communication and Resolution following Medical Injury (2019). MACRMI: About CARe. [online] Available at: [Accessed 16 Jun. 2019].


7.  Sokol, D. 2014. "Renewing the Call for Clinical Ethicists". BMJ 349. 2: g5342-g5342.


8. Aulisio, M. (2016). “Why Did Hospital Ethics Committees Emerge in the US?”. The AMA Journal of Ethics, 18(5), pp.546-553.



  1. Makary, M, and Daniel, M. 2016. "Medical Error—The Third Leading Cause of Death in the US". BMJ, p.i2139.
  2. Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014
  3. Cohen, D. 2017. "Back to Blame: The Bawa-Garba Case and the Patient Safety Agenda". BMJ, j5534.

4.      Michigan Medicine. University of Michigan (2019). The Michigan Model: Medical Malpractice and Patient Safety at Michigan Medicine. [online] University of Michigan. Available at: [Accessed 16 June 2019].

  1. BIDMC. Eliminating Preventable Harm at BIDMC. [Accessed 16 June 2019]

6.      Massachusetts Alliance for Communication and Resolution following Medical Injury (2019). MACRMI: About CARe. [online] Available at: [Accessed 16 Jun. 2019].

7.      Sokol, D. 2014. "Renewing the Call for Clinical Ethicists". BMJ 349. 2: g5342-g5342.

8.      Aulisio, M. (2016). “Why Did Hospital Ethics Committees Emerge in the US?”. The AMA Journal of Ethics, 18(5), pp.546-553.

Lydia Daniels, a medical student at Imperial College London received an IME Scholarship for her intercalated BSc in Medical Sciences with Humanities, Philosophy & Law, Sept 2018. Read the report of her project below

Should doctors be the arbiters in decisions to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration from minimally conscious and vegetative patients?

My project focuses upon the decision to withdrawal artificial nutrition and hydration from patients in a vegetative or minimally conscious state. More specifically, I respond to the ruling in An NHS Trust v Y (2018) (hereafter, NHS v Y), by asking, should doctors be the ultimate arbiters of these decisions, according to the nature of the decision and the doctor's role?

The landmark case of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (1993) (hereafter, Bland) ruled that indefinitely prolonging a life in a vegetative or minimally conscious state may not always be in the patient's best interests and hence that withdrawing ANH can be legal. The question of 'who decides' was granted legal clarity in NHS v Y, a Supreme Court ruling which confirmed that doctors can withdraw ANH from patients in permanent vegetative and minimally conscious states (PVS and MCS) without recourse to the courts, providing there is agreement between the doctor and the family that this is in the patient's best interests.

Making this decision in the clinical setting has clear practical and economic benefits. Halliday et al. (2015) states that NHS economists estimate the average court referral process costs around £122,000, and Holland et al. (2014) highlight the emotional distress that delays in withdrawal can cause families.

Beyond its practical implications, the ruling in NHS v Y prompts us to reflect on the critical question of whether doctors should be entrusted with decision-making power in these cases. Wicks (2019) claims this ruling threatens the patient's right to life by removing a neutral advocate in the court, and Foster (2018) argues the ruling could lead to paternalistic decision-making orientated around biomedical need rather than patient wishes. However, in order to make a more robust evaluation of this ruling we must take a broader view. As Lord Browne-Wilkinson states in Bland, 'behind the questions of law lie moral, ethical, medical and practical issues of fundamental importance to society' (p877). These issues need to be evaluated in order to test whether the ruling in NHS v Y reflects a fair balance of perspectives. My project uses a multidisciplinary approach by looking at the sociological background, legal context and professional implications of the ruling in NHS v Y to assess whether doctors are well-placed as arbiters of these decisions.

Firstly, I track the court's deference to the medical profession, particularly following the shift towards greater respect for patient autonomy demonstrated in the Mental Capacity Act (2005). Looking forward to NHS v Y, I have identified the element of deference in the ruling's assertion of doctors as arbiters of these decisions and its reliance upon professional regulation. However, I argue that this deference can be dissociated from traditional, paternalistic notions of the term, in light of how the profession and its guidance has evolved to become more patient-centred, as suggested by Devaney and Holm (2018).

I also investigate the nature of the decision doctors are being asked to make: firstly how the concept of best interests has evolved to become more holistic, and secondly whether withdrawal of ANH from PVS/MCS cases ought be to categorised as 'special cases'. My project considers that viewing PVS/MCS patients as deserving of a higher safeguarding standard than other patients is unjustified, and that the technicalities of diagnosis should not overshadow consideration of the patient's wishes. NHS v Y has rightly aligned these decisions with other life and death best interest decisions, however the significance of ANH and its withdrawal for families should be taken into account by doctors and discussed with sensitivity.

I then focus on whether clinical decision-making in the present day lends itself to withdrawal decisions, including discussion of the broader role of ethical decisions in medicine. Contrary to the concern that this ruling will incite paternalistic decision-making, empowering doctors to be arbiters of these particular decisions allows timely withdrawal of ANH when it is agreed to no longer be in the patient's best interests. I argue, therefore, that this model may demonstrate greater respect for the patient's wishes.

Paternalistic or idiosyncratic decision-making is mitigated against by the rigour of the professional guidance. I have considered that the measures which have been put in place within the guidance have created sufficient safeguards for the patient's right to life: consultation with those concerned for the patient's welfare, the expert 'second opinion' and the option to consult the courts.

My project concludes that the ruling in NHS v Y represents a positive step forward, asserting the doctor as the arbiter of these withdrawal decisions and recognising their ability to develop and exercise sound ethical decision-making, for the ultimate benefit of the profession and its patients.

Although this project has advocated doctors as the appropriate decision-maker in these sensitive and important scenarios, this must correspond with standards in clinical training. I recommend that medical schools ensure that they facilitate the development of sound ethical reflection and knowledge of the law to equip future doctors to face such scenarios. Incorporating this into a broader study of medical humanities would give students an appreciation of the profession's historical and sociological context as well as the narratives brought forwards by patients. This would encourage future doctors to properly evaluate their assumptions alongside patients' personal, religious and cultural values.

With heaviness of heart I recognise that the voices of PVS and MCS patients cannot contribute to this debate. Unless we are able to establish communication with these patients, the decision-maker must rely on second-hand accounts of previously-expressed feelings and values. It has been deeply moving to consider the impact of the decision-making process on the family, many of whom see withdrawing ANH as an impossibly difficult decision, but at the present time, the only feasible option to allow their relatives to die. This project also illuminates the need to encourage patients to draft advance decisions to refuse treatment where appropriate, ensuring these are properly documented and respected by healthcare teams.

I am incredibly grateful for the opportunity to explore this topic and extend particular gratitude to the IME for their financial support.


Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (1993) House of Lords, AC 789 (House of Lords)

An NHS Trust & Ors v Y & Anor (2018) Supreme Court, UKSC 46 (Supreme Court)

Mental Capacity Act (2005) (c.9) United Kingdom. London: HMSO. Available at:

Devaney, S. & Holm, S., 2018. The Transmutation of Deference in Medicine: An Ethico-Legal Perspective. Medical Law Review, 1 5, 26(2), pp. 202-224.

Foster, C., 2019. The rebirth of medical paternalism: An NHS Trust v Y. Journal of medical ethics, 1 1, 45(1), pp. 3-7.

Halliday, S., Formby, A. & Cookson, R., 2015. An assessment of the court's role in the withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration from patients in the permanent vegetative state. Medical Law Review, 23(4), pp. 556-587.

Holland, S., Kitzinger, C. & Kitzinger, J., 2014. Death, treatment decisions and the permanent vegetative state: evidence from families and experts. Medicine, health care, and philosophy, 8, 17(3), pp. 413-23.

Wicks, E., 2019. An NHS Trust and others v Y and another (2018) UKSC 46: Reducing the Role of the Courts in Treatment Withdrawal. Medical Law Review, 15 1

Rachel Burnley, a student at University of Bristol Medical School, recently received an IME Institutional Grant to help fund the BSc Bioethics student-led conference 'Personal Beliefs within Medicine' held March 2019.

Click HERE to read the report which highlights an excellent example of a university involving students from local schools and colleges in ethics conferences as part of their widening participation scheme.

The Nuffield Council on Bioethics has published a bioethics briefing note on disagreements in the care and treatment of critically ill babies and young children.

The briefing note outlines the possible causes of disagreements between parents and healthcare staff, and highlights areas of action for healthcare policy-makers and NHS leaders that could help to prevent prolonged and damaging disagreements developing in future, or to resolve them more quickly.


Overall, they suggest the aim should be:

  • good communication between families and staff and an understanding of differing perspectives

  • appropriate involvement of parents in discussions and decisions about the care and treatment of their child

  • timely use of resolution interventions, such as mediation, in cases of disagreement

  • attention to the profound psychological effects that disagreements can have for families and staff.


    The briefing note is available at: 

    Please do not hesitate to get in touch with Nuffield Council on Bioethics if you would like to discuss any aspects of the briefing note:

    020 7681 9622 |


T: +44 (0) 20 7681 9622 | E:

Financial support for carers. Had an abstract accepted for the IME Conference 2019?

If you have had an accepted accepted for the IME Conference on 24-26 June 2019 at Cardiff Metropolitan University, you might be eligible for financial support for carers.

The IME recognises that for those of you with caring responsibilities, attending events such as the IME Conference is an important part of developing and maintaining your career.  The IME also understands that attending such events can cause an additional financial burden if you need to make alternative care arrangements.

To help alleviate some of this burden, we are introducing a scheme which may entitle you to a small grant of up to £250 (maximum fund of £2,000) if you have caring responsibilities.  In order to qualify for the grant you must have an abstract accepted for the conference. *Abstract Submissions are now closed*

The grant can be used to fund additional/alternative care arrangements for your dependent* to either stay at home while you travel, or to fund travel and associated care costs allowing the dependant to travel with you.

A dependant is a partner, child or parent, or someone who lives with you as part of your family. This could be, for example, an elderly aunt or grandparent. It does not include tenants or boarders who may be living in your family home.

You may make an application for this grant if the following conditions apply:

·You have caring responsibilities and nobody else at your home can provide the care.

·No alternative source of funding is available, e.g. from the conference/training etc. organiser or by other means, such as from research grant funding.  Where relevant it is your responsibility to provide evidence that no alternative source of funding is available.

·The grant is to cover costs outside of the routine everyday care costs you normally incur.

The funds will be paid on receipt of an invoice/receipt detailing the costs incurred. Please note that any impact on benefits or HMRC impacts are the responsibility of the applicant.

Click here for an application form.

Click here for guidelines.


National Student Debate Final 2019

Winners! The Keele team

Winners! The team from Keele

Congratulations to the team from Keele University who took on the reigning champions Queen's University Belfast at the 2019 National Student Debate Final in Manchester on Saturday 9 March. Queen's won both the 2017 and 2018 finals & proved to be tough opponents during the 2019 final but, in the end, Keele triumphed.The motion was Law & professional guidance should abandon the 'best interests' test in favour of the 'serious harm' test when deciding whether to override the decisions of parents about treatment for their children.

Congratulations once agan to Keele and commiserations to tough opponents Queen's.

Thank you to all the teams who entered, in particular those who reached the final: Keele University - Queen's University Belfast - University of Liverpool - University of Exeter - University of Sheffield - University of Cambridge - University of Cambridge - University of Birmingham.

Thank you also to our guest speaker, Dr Joe Brierley (Consultant Paediatric Intensive Care & Director of Bioethics), Great Ormond Street Hospital who spoke to the students about Paediatric Bioethics, and also to our panel of judges: Georgia Testa, Dr Richard Knox, Dr Joe Brierley, Miss Lorraine Corfield, Dr Vivienne Crawford, Dr Simon Deery, Julie Stone, Jordan Parsons and Dr Daniel Tigard.

Details of next year's competition will be announced later this year.

Runners up Queen's Dr Joe Brierley Runners up Queen's and

Dr Joe Brierley, Great Ormond St Hospital

Calling Medical Undergraduates! The IME Student Council are recruiting!

Click here for details and how to apply.

Join us & help promote interest & awareness of medical ethics.

Deadline for applications: midnight, Sunday 2 June 2019

IME Student Conference 2019: Medical Ethics in a Technologically Advancing World

Click here to read a conference review, by Charlotte Galvin, intercalating medical student, Keele University and IME Student Conference Vice Chair.

Dr Richard Shoulder was awarded a full elective bursary 2017/18 for his project entitled 'Elective Ethical Toolkit - an essential for medical students working abroad' whilst in his final year at University of Bristol.

Richard is also the 2018 winner of The Mark Brennan Poster Prize (bursary category) for his poster of the project. Congratulations Richard!

To read Richard's elective report (which includes the Elective Ethical Toolkit), click here.

Progress Educational Trust Annual Conference - Institutional Grant Report

PET conference_2018The IME was pleased to be able to award an Institutional Grant to PET to fund the attendance of eight medical students at their annual conference Make Do or Amend: Should We Update UK Fertility and Embryo Law? on 5 December 2018.

Read their report below ...

The Progress Educational Trust (PET) is an independent registered charity founded in 1992 to advance public understanding of ethics, law and science in the fields of human genetics, assisted reproduction and embryo/stem cell research.

PET works to improve choices for people affected by infertility and genetic conditions, and to promote the responsible application of science through education and debate.

PET's discussion conference Make Do or Amend: Should We Update UK Fertility and Embryo Law?, which was held at Amnesty International in London, on 5 December 2018, explored law and regulation governing fertility treatment and embryo research.

In the PET tradition, following introductory presentations the bulk of each session's running time was devoted to soliciting questions and comments from the audience.

Conference sessions included:

The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: Is It Broke and Should We Fix It?

Society Marches On: Key Social Changes

Science Marches On: Key Scientific Developments

New Science, New Families, Old Law: Is the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act Fit for Purpose?

A Patchwork of Policies: Assisted Conception and Embryo Research in Europe

The Future of Fertility Law: What Must Change and When?

How the Institute of Medical Ethics made a difference

By funding places for eight medical students to attend the conference free of charge, the Institute of Medical Ethics (IME) made the event substantially more accessible. The medical students who made use of these places, contributing to the 220-strong audience, were from the Universities of Birmingham, Sheffield and Liverpool and from Manchester Metropolitan University. One student also attended from Australia's Monash University, currently a visiting student at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics.

Thanks to the IME, it was possible for these students to participate in an event whose cost would otherwise have been prohibitive – especially when combined with the cost of travel.

Furthermore, association with a body such as the IME gives an imprimatur of quality to the event. Prospective delegates who are unfamiliar with PET's work in bioethics are given confidence that the conference will be of a high standard.

Feedback from attendees:

220 people attended the PET conference, of the attendees who completed feedback forms, 100 per cent rated the conference as either excellent or good overall, and 97 per cent said they were better informed as a result of attending.

Several of the students who received sponsored places gave specific feedback:

Charlotte McDowell (University of Sheffield):

'I'm a third-year medical student planning to intercalate in medical ethics and law next year. I find the topic of surrogacy to be particularly interesting, and I went to the event in the hopes of getting a better understanding of the current ethical and legal issues. The event was very engaging, and I really enjoyed it. All of the speakers were interesting and well selected. The talks given only furthered my interest in intercalating in medical ethics and law. I also have to write an essay for my applications for intercalated degrees, and I decided as a result of the event to write about the ethical issues surrounding commercial surrogacy. I would like to thank the IME for kindly subsidising places, as I could not have attended without this.'

Lucy Benham Whyte (Manchester Metropolitan University and University Hospital Coventry):

'I am extremely grateful for the subsidised place that was available to me, since I would not have been able to afford to come to London on the student budget alone. This particular event was extremely relevant to my studies as a trainee embryologist, and I feel my level of knowledge in regard to embryo and fertility law is much more advanced as a result. I hope I will be able to attend many PET conferences in the future.'

Lydia di Stefano (Monash University):

'I found the conference really interesting and helpful to complement the biomedical perspectives I have heard about assisted reproductive technologies at medical school. I would not have been able to attend the conference without being sponsored.'

Sam Calmonson (University of Birmingham):

'I was able to attend the Progress Educational Trust conference thanks to the IME. It was fantastic opportunity to increase my knowledge about the topic. All the speakers gave an interesting insight into their views, and the short presentations helped to keep the conference moving, whilst generating debate and conversation. As a medical student, this was an interesting day away from the main course that I would highly recommend to anyone interested in ethics.'

Gemma Skilton, a final year medical student at the University of Birmingham, received an IME grant to present her paper at the 13th World Conference on Bioethics, Medical Ethics & Health Law, Jerusalem, Nov 2018

Read her report below as an example of the IME enabling students to participate in an international conference & to hear diverse views on important topics.

In November of this year, I received a conference grant from the IME that allowed me to travel to Jerusalem in order to present my research at the 13th World Conference on Bioethics, Medical Ethics and Health Law. This was a 3-day conference that took place from the 27-29th November 2018. As a medical student at the University of Birmingham I had previously completed an intercalated degree in Healthcare Ethics and Law. It was during this degree that I conducted the research which I was then able to deliver during my oral presentation at this conference. Thus, as a medical student with an intercalated degree in this field, I was incredibly excited and grateful for this opportunity not only to present my own work but also to learn from many other like-minded people presenting their own research on varied topics within the field of healthcare ethics and law.

This conference offered over 500 presentations across more than 60 topics and subtopics, with presenters coming from 63 different countries. The sheer size, variety and international nature of the conference made for an amazing and unique experience. Never before had I had the opportunity to hear from such a diverse group of people about the many different ethical and legal issues affecting them in all different parts of the world. As just one example, the ethics of psychiatric assessment to possess firearms is an ethical issue that seldom requires reflection in the UK, however the application of these issues in the USA was a novel consideration for me. Particularly poignant was the phrase coined by the presenter, a psychiatrist working in the USA, “I cannot take your guns away from you, but I can take you away from your guns”. The enriching opportunity to consider different international perspectives on medical ethics and law served to further my already great interest in this field. Not only this, the conference also presented the opportunity to consider ethical issues within other fields than medical ethics such as immigration ethics and the ethical responsibilities within migration policies.


As outlined, this conference really opened my eyes to a diverse range of ethical issues which I had not previously reflected upon. However, given that I was also there to present my own research, my experience of the conference in relation to this cannot go without reflection. The topic of my research was based upon the informed consent process for the implantation of implantable cardioverter defibrillators (ICDs) and whether discussing deactivation ought to make up a part of this. Consequently, I found several of the informed consent themed sessions incredibly engaging and thought provoking in relation to the background of my own research. For example, one delegate delivered her legal analysis of “the hidden paternalism in Montgomery” which was particularly interesting to reflect upon given that an analysis of UK case law on informed consent made up a section of my own research. I was very lucky to have been accepted not only to give an oral presentation but also to co-chair the session in which I was presenting, both of which were new experiences to me. I was one of five presenters in my session themed around informed consent. Two delegates, both from Israel, presented on the topic of the readability standards of informed consent and health literacy level. Another delegate, from South Africa, presented his research regarding informed consent for Biobank research. Finally, the fourth delegate, also from University of Birmingham, presented the ethical issues around gaining informed consent for complex procedures. This experience has been valuable firstly, in assisting the development of my presentation skills. Secondly, in allowing me to share my research with international experts and to hear about their research in turn, using this exposure to further refine my ideas and ethical understanding of the different concepts and issues around informed consent.

The sheer size and variety of this conference made for a truly unforgettable experience. Whilst at times its size and diversity felt a little overwhelming, this was only because there were so many talks to visit that one wished that they could somehow be in several places at once! It was a real inspiration and privilege to be amongst such a wide array of people all so passionate about medical ethics and law and I would thoroughly recommend this conference to all medical students with such an interest like myself. I am incredibly grateful to the IME for the support they have given me which allowed me to do this.




Sam Calmonson, a final year medical student at University of Birmingham, received an IME conference grant to give an oral presentation at the 13th World Conference on Bioethics, Medical Ethics & Health Law, Jerusalem, November 2018. Read his report below

Thanks to the Institute of Medical Ethics Conference Grant programme, I had the opportunity to attend the 13th World Conference on Bioethics, Medical Ethics and Health Law, organised by the UNESCO Chair in Bioethics. The conference took place in the Ramada Hotel in Jerusalem and ran across three days, with over 800 participants discussing more than 60 topics in bioethics and law.

Each day was split into sessions, with the vast majority of each sessions having five 15 minute presentations under a common theme, leaving a short amount of time for general questions at the end. Some operated as a round table discussion between experts in a topic, followed by a generalised discussion involving the audience afterward. Outside these scheduled hours, the set-up of the hotel allowed for fruitful discussion about the ethical topics, as well as an opportunity to ask more detailed questions of the presenters and their work. This is something with which I actively engaged, finding their comments on my own work very helpful. The sheer variety of opportunities to learn about new and developing research was astounding.

Of the topics available, I particularly enjoyed session relating to the ethics of informed consent, ethics in Jewish law, ethical decision-making in psychiatric patients and the other presentations in my own session on 'Death and Dying: Life's Beginning'. In the session about informed consent, there was research published by surgeons describing the ethical implications of consenting patients to surgery carried out by trainees and the degree to which consent for this needed to be gained. This sparked debate about the 'minimally good samaritan' and whether there exists a collective societal obligation to be treated by trainee doctors for the good of the society. This was followed by a philosopher's approach to using the informed consent principle as an argument for euthanasia. The session about Jewish law discussed arguments about abortion based upon the debate between two famous biblical scholars, as well as looking at the religious interpretations about genome editing - something important for future healthcare practices in Israel. After my own presentation about the ethics of withholding resuscitation from extremely premature neonates, there was a presentation about extending Canada's Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD) programme to those who are under 18 years of age, using case studies of teenage cancer patients who have reached palliative stages but not the age above which MAiD was available. This extended into a wider debate about assisted dying in general. Similarly, a psychiatrist from Harvard Medical School talked the topic of assisted dying in psychiatry the following morning. These topics tended to generate the most conversation during the questions and answer sessions. Another presentation that I found particularly interesting was the question of administering contraception to migrants in expectation of rape. The question posed by the presenter was whether this was ethically justified by preventing pregnancy or complicit by not preventing rape. The consequentialist argument found that contraception was a net good and therefore ethical, but the topic raised the wider topic of migrants from other countries, something that has taken a back seat in the wider news today.

I thoroughly enjoyed the opportunity to present my own research to an audience of about 50 people. It was a new experience, involving dealing with people who vehemently disagreed with my content during my presentation as well as those who actively engaged with my work and sought me out after to continue the discussion. I have been able improve my own work and find helpful people to consult in the future. None of this could have been possible with the generous grant from the Institute of Medical Ethics and it is to them that I am most grateful for allowing me this enriching opportunity.

Paolo Corsico, PhD student, University of Manchester School of Law, received an IME conference grant to present at the American Society for Bioethics & Humanities conf, & the International Neuroethics Society annual meeting 2018. Read his report below

Report on American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) annual conference and International Neuroethics Society (INS) annual meeting

California, October – November 2018

Last October, I received an IME conference grant to go to California and attend two of the most important bioethics conferences worldwide. Thanks to the generous support of IME, I was able to take part in the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) annual conference in Anaheim, on October 18-21, 2018. Ten days later, I took part in the annual meeting of the International Neuroethics Society (INS) in San Diego. As a European postgraduate student in bioethics, I was eager to learn about trends, priorities, and novel challenges in medical ethics as they are experienced by colleagues in North America.

It is hard to describe how vast, inclusive, and far-reaching was the array of issues addressed by more than 600 presentations during the four-day ASBH conference. You need a mobile app to navigate the programme at ASBH. Still, it is difficult to decide which sessions to attend. The keynote speakers addressed what I believe to be two overarching themes of the conference: new 'epidemics' and global health challenges, and the relevance of health humanities in contemporary culture and clinical education.

The first keynote speaker Jonathan Metzl, professor of sociology and psychiatry at Vanderbilt University, Tennessee reflected on the relationships between mass shootings and mental illness. In his inspiring lecture, Metzl noted that:

The US gun violence epidemic is made worse by polarized debates, which are fuelled by stereotypes around mental illness and race.

Three stereotypes characterize the problematic narrative according to which 'mental illness is the problem in mass shootings': 1) the mentally ill are disproportionately violent, 2) psychiatric expertise can predict gun violence, and 3) gun violence is the result of 'dangerous loners' or 'violent cultures'.

The way in which we build narratives around mental illness and gun violence is stigmatizing. We must challenge such stereotypes, give up polarized debates, and start working together to build a safer society.

With reference to the health humanities, Despina Kakoudaki, director of the Humanities Lab at the American University in Washington DC engaged the ASBH audience with a fascinating overview of Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. Her keynote shed light on the cultural understanding of artificial bodies and robots. Kakoudaki argued that the discourse on artificial bodies has been ongoing for centuries. This discourse includes the ancient ideas of 'artificial birth' and 'mechanical body', as well as the modern idea of 'mechanical slaves' and that of 'existential cyborgs'. Two key points of her lecture were that:

Real robots are now changing our world. However, real robots are sometimes non-recognizable in everyday life, as embodiment and location of artificial agents influence the perception of their agency.

If robots become self-aware, like Frankenstein, they might demand rights and liberty. This is a real political issue that we ought to address.

The INS annual meeting, entitled "Cutting Edge Neuroscience, Cutting Edge Neuroethics" was held at San Diego Central Library on November 1-2, 2018. Smaller than ASBH, but by no means less engaging, the meeting aimed at rethinking the role of neuroethics for the occasion of the 10th annual conference. Central themes were the growing expansion of digital neuro-technologies in health care domains, and the impact of neuro-technology on individuals' identities and public policies.

I particularly appreciated the opening keynote address, delivered by the president of Mindstrong Health, Tom Insel. Dr Insel highlighted the disruptive potential of digital phenotyping—that is, the measurement of individual cognition, emotion, and behaviour by using data from smartphones and wearables—to address 'disorders of behaviour'. The key messages of his keynote were that:

Digital phenotyping has the potential to revolutionize the way we manage disorders of behaviour, by giving us access to data that are objective, continuous, ecological, and passive.

Ethical challenges emerge within two domains: 1) issues of value, which include the efficacy of novel tools and user engagement, and 2) issues of trust, which include transparency, agency, and responsibility.

Emily Postan from the University of Edinburgh then gave an engaging 'rising star plenary lecture'. Postan argued that access to neuro-information has the potential to affect our identities and that our primary concern should not be with the abuse of neuro-information by others, but with the use that we ourselves make of it. Postan's central claim was that beliefs about the brain and the mind influence our self-narratives in positive and negative ways. We should ensure that access to neuro-information benefits the construction of our self-narratives and the development of our personal identities.

I believe that any student in bioethics and medical humanities would greatly benefit from attending ASBH and INS. Not only for the opportunity to network with fellow ethicists from all over the world, nor for the conferences' cutting-edge approach to ethics and policy debates. Most importantly, I think that early career bioethicists should attend the ASBH and INS annual conferences because they are outstanding opportunities for personal and professional development. I am deeply grateful to the IME for having supported me.

Paolo Corsico, PhD candidate in Bioethics and Medical Jurisprudence, CSEP, School of Law, the University of Manchester

Below: American Society for Bioethics & Humanities Conference, Anaheim

ASBH, Anaheim